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Abstract 
 
Multinational enterprise provides access to a diverse resource base that may support options 
related business initiatives and operational flexibilities with a potential to improve performance 
and risk management capabilities. Hence, multinationality should be associated with strategic 
responsiveness as real option structures allow the corporation to exploit new initiatives and 
pursue alternative actions. This, in turn should improve economic performance and risk 
management capabilities as corporate activities are adapted and new initiatives introduced in 
response to changing global conditions. The analyses of a cross-sectional sample comprising 
1357 multinational firms during 1996-2000 partially support the proposed performance and risk 
management effects but also raise issues for further study.       
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The multinational enterprise has access to an extended range of tangible and intangible resources that 
provide the organization with incremental strategic opportunity (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Yip, 1995; 
Barttlet and Ghoshal, 1998; Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001). It is argued that international resources can 
form the basis for options related operational flexibilities with potential performance and risk 
management advantages (Kogut, 1985; Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). This 
perspective has been extended to argue that diverse multinational knowledge can be recombined to 
create responsive business initiatives (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Grant, 1996; Foss and Pedersen, 2002; 
Andersen and Foss, 2005). Hence, the multinational enterprise should exhibit a higher degree of 
responsiveness in strategic decision-making as real option structures extend the ability to exploit new 
initiatives and pursue alternative actions in response to changing global conditions, which in turn should 
improve economic performance and risk management capabilities. However, the exploitation of 
underlying real option structures requires a certain financial buffer and, therefore, lower financial 
leverage is likely to enhance the proposed performance effects incorporating capital structure as a 
central strategic decision parameter (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). This study investigates a cross-
sectional sample of 1357 multinational firms during the period 1996-2000 and finds some evidence in 
support of the proposed performance and risk management effects.       
The paper outlines the proposed advantages associated with multinational enterprise and 
provides a brief overview of the basic finance and strategic management literatures on capital structure 
and risk management. Aspects of agency theory, transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, 
and real options reasoning are integrated in the development of associated hypotheses.  Following this, 
the paper describes the empirical study performed to test the hypotheses and presents outcomes from the 
analyses. Finally, the findings are discussed and venues for further research efforts are proposed.  
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THEORY AND LITERATURE 
Multinational performance  
The wider array of business opportunities across different national markets should provide flexibility to 
firms that maintain a multinational organization and thereby increase the ability to respond to changing 
environmental conditions.  It has specifically been argued that operational flexibilities can allow the 
corporation to reposition and restructure in response to changes in international price relations by 
shifting activities between national entities controlled by the multinational enterprise (Kogut, 1985; 
Rangan, 1998).  The ability to switch business activities across international productive assets can be 
conceived as a particular real option structure where the value of the implied flexibility can be 
determined on the basis of option pricing theory (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).  The flexibility of a 
multinational organization should allow the corporation to mitigate effects of major economic 
exposures, e.g., associated with changes in relative demand conditions and factor costs across national 
environments (Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Kogut and Chang, 1996).   
Furthermore, a multinational organization may provide opportunities to exchange diverse 
knowledge between national environments where different insights and perspectives enhance the ability 
to innovate and develop new growth options (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993; Grant, 1996). So, 
multinationality might be linked to the innovative capacity of multinational diversity and forming the 
basis for strategic opportunity that can increase maneuverability in an uncertain global environment 
(e.g., Mang, 1998; Desouza and Evaristo, 2003; Andersen and Foss, 2005). This particular view of 
multinationality has some resemblance to innovation strategy as the firm expends resources towards the 
creation of a more innovative multinational organization.  In either case, the multinational organization 
should increase flexibility and strategic responsiveness and thereby improve economic performance.  
 
Risk management effects 
The presence of real options based flexibilities should enhance effective risk management practices that 
diminish earnings volatility and thereby reduce the costs associated with potential financial distress. If 
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the volatility of the firm’s cash flows is reduced and the firm maintains a certain financial cushion in the 
form liquid financial assets and committed credit facilities then funding should always be available for 
positive NPV projects, all the while the lower performance volatility will reduce the firm’s average cost 
of capital. To the extent an organization is able to manage uncertainties imposed by dynamic global 
conditions potential under investment problems would be reduced resulting in higher earnings (Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993, 1994). Hence, risk management can be extended to include a real options 
perspective where firms are able to develop opportunities and claims on the future that can be evaluated 
based of assumptions about underlying risk factors (Leiblein, 2003). The real option structures differ 
from financial options in the way the option value is tied to idiosyncratic conditions in the firm 
(McGrath, 1997) as well as firm specific strategy processes may differ in unique ways that influence the 
firm’s ability to exploit the options. Hence, the presence of real options should be able to enhance 
sustainable value creation since they are based on firm specific assets and processes not readily available 
in public markets (Barney, 1991). 
 
Financial leverage 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that under simplifying conditions of no taxes, transaction costs, or 
bankruptcy costs, the value of the firm will be independent of capital structure. However, when taxes 
interfere and interest expenses are tax deductable, the optimal capital structure will be determined by a 
trade-off between increased bankruptcy risk from a higher debt load and the tax advantage of debt 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Under conditions of asymmetric information where managers in the firm 
know more about prospective projects than investors in the market, the capital structure may be 
determined in accordance with a pecking order whereby internal sources are used to fund good projects 
first while debt only is assumed to finance less attractive marginal projects (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
The trade-off perspective results in a proportional relationship between economic performance and 
leverage whereas the pecking order perspective is more indeterminate.    
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Potential agency costs associated with equity financing derive from the possibility that 
managers divert productive resources to employment benefits with limited returns to shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This discrepancy between management and shareholder interests can 
have implications for investment decisions. Management could issue equity to pursue their own 
objectives and engage the firm in questionable projects that would lead to over investment (Jensen, 
1986; Stulz, 1990). Increasing the debt load might arguably solve this problem but excessive financial 
leverage can also create an under investment problem as debt service payments limit the discretion to 
engage in new business initiatives (Myers, 1977).  
Ward (1993) distinguished between business risk imposed by uncertainty imposed by the 
competitive environment and financial risk associated with the positions of funds providers (lenders, 
investors, and shareholders) and funds users (firm management). From a management perspective debt 
is riskier because regular debt service payments are enforceable whereas equity is less risky. 
Conversely, equity is riskier to investing shareholders because it constitutes residual claims that serve as 
a buffer to ensure the servicing of senior debt obligations. Hence, firm management should be inclined 
to use equity funding for ventures with high business risk because it provides a higher financial buffer to 
cope with an uncertain competitive environment. Conversely, debt instruments would be better suited to 
fund relatively stable business activities where the need for a financial buffer is lower, i.e., there should 
arguably be an inverse relationship between business risk and financial leverage. This phenomenon has 
been identified in some empirical studies using different conceptualizations of business risk, such as, 
variance in sales growth (Thies and Klock, 1992) and volatility of demand (Chung, 1993).  
 
Environmental dynamism 
From a resource-based view, sustainable competitive advantage reflected in excess rents or 
Shumpeterian returns can be obtained by deploying valuable, rare, inimitable, and organized firm 
specific assets (Barney, 1991). This implies that firms operating in dynamic environments must pursue 
innovative behaviors and engage in more risky initiative to create superior performance, which will 
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impose a higher level of business risk on corporate activities and call for lower financial leverage. 
Transaction cost economics suggest that transaction costs are lower when they are carried out on the 
basis of standardized assets whereas transaction costs are higher in the case of firm specific assets 
(Williamson, 1988). Therefore, high asset specificity makes internal hierarchical coordination more 
economical compared to market clearance of transactions. A higher equity base reflects internal 
hierarchical control whereas higher leverage imposes market discipline on organizational activities. 
Hence, equity should be the preferred source of financing when asset specificity is high (Harris, 1994). 
Since dynamic environments arguably require deployment of assets with high specificity, equity funding 
should lower transaction costs in this situation and, therefore, constitute a more suitable funding 
alternative. Conversely, debt should be more appropriate to fund assets with a lower specificity as they 
pertain to relatively stable environments.   
From the perspective of agency theory, debt can be used as a disciplinary tool to ensure that 
managers give preference to wealth creation for the equity holders (Jensen, 1986, 1989).  In this set-up, 
lenders are the prime governance constituents because debt payment obligations and restrictive 
covenants make it more difficult for indebted firms to engage in risky peripheral business initiatives. 
Conversely, it will also reduce the number of strategic opportunities available to the firm and thereby 
makes it more difficult to maneuver in dynamic market environments. In other words, debt can become 
too restrictive for firms operating in rapidly changing industries that require a high degree of strategic 
responsiveness.  Together, these arguments imply that the appropriate financial strategy in dynamic 
environments is to reduce leverage to economize on transaction cost and ensure flexibility and 
responsiveness.   
The resource-based view argues that contemporary dynamic environments characterized by 
ongoing innovation require strategies driven by firm specific assets and processes (Barney, 1991). The 
transaction cost perspective further argues that the idiosyncratic assets employed in innovative 
initiatives makes equity financing more economical and constitutes a better market signal (Santorelli, 
1991; Banerjee and Wihlborg, 2003). Since information asymmetry between internal managers and 
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external investors is higher in innovative and R&D intensive organizations, the level of financial slack 
also tends to increase (Opler and Titman, 1994; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999).  Hence, 
to succeed with an innovation strategy in dynamic environments it is necessary to maintain a certain 
financial buffer to ensure sufficient funding sources for development investments, product launches, and 
ongoing knowledge expansion (O’Brien, 2003). The empirical evidence seems to confirm the existence 
of such an inverse relationship between R&D intensity and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Opler 
and Titman, 1994; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001). 
 
Risk management perspectives 
Risk management practices have evolved in conjunction with the growth in derivative instruments and 
new product enhancements bridging the conventional insurance and capital markets (Rawls and 
Smithson, 1990; Shimpi, 1999; Colarossi, 2001). Many of the risk management techniques have been 
developed in the financial industry, which by definition constitutes risk management business (e.g., 
Saunders, 2003). Effective risk management practices dampen the variability in periodic earnings and 
thereby reduce the average cost of funding. The availability of more favorably priced funding eliminates 
potential under investment problems, which constitutes a basic argument for financial hedging (Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993, 1994). The ‘insurative’ model incorporating financial derivatives, insurance 
contracts, and equity funding as residual claims illustrates that capital structure decisions and risk 
management are intertwined issues (Shimpi, 1999). Equity is needed as a cushion against adverse 
economic outcomes to assure stakeholders about the strength, stability, and soundness of the firm as a 
going concern. Engagement in insurance and derivatives serves the same purpose by transferring 
exposures beyond the discretionary control of management to financial market participants and, 
therefore, constitute important sources of financial capital (Culp, 2002).   
Miller (1998) argues that it is important to improve risk management capabilities relating to 
firm specific exposures because many stakeholders are unable to diversify investments geared 
specifically to the firm in buyer and supplier relationships, business partnerships, management and 
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employment contracts, etc. Since competitive exposures often require strategic responses that are unique 
to the firm there is a limit to how far conventional risk-transfer instruments can accomplish this task. 
Hence, a firm may try to invest in the creation of real option structures to deal with these risk factors and 
thereby improve the ability to respond to competitive exposures.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
The literature review suggests that a possible two-thronged theoretical rationale for performance effects 
of multinationality is at play, one effect associated with operational flexibilities based on tangible 
resources and another effect associated with innovative behavior based on intangible resources. The first 
effect should apply to firms with geographically dispersed operating assets, e.g., in production, 
distribution, and retailing activities. The ability to switch sourcing, production, and sales across different 
currency jurisdictions allows a multinational enterprise to take advantage of favorable foreign exchange 
rate regimes and increase responsiveness to exploit changes in international demand and price relations 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Kogut and Chang, 1996). The latter effect should be relevant to firms 
engaging in more knowledge intensive business activities, e.g., a corporate emphasis on after sales 
services, new product innovations, or operations focused directly in service oriented industries 
(Contractor, Kundu and Hsu, 2003). An innovation strategy is associated with the creation of new 
growth options for the firm including potential product introductions and process improvements (Myers, 
1984). The creation of real options is associated with recognition of inherent flexibilities embedded in 
existing resources that can enable the firm to modify its strategic position (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). 
The implied portfolio of real option structures provide the firm with a wider choice of alternative 
strategic actions and an ability to time new responsive strategic moves better to the firm’s economic 
advantage (Leuhrman, 1998). This rationale leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
   HYPOTHESIS 1:   A higher degree of multinationality is positively associated with economic 
        performance 
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Hence, multinationality can be conceived as a form of innovation strategy where a diverse international 
resource base is used to create growth options that extend the strategic opportunities available across 
different national markets (Grant, 1996; Foss and Pedersen, 2002). The embedded strategic 
opportunities can be exploited to the firm’s economic advantage but the development of innovative 
initiatives that lead to new growth options requires a certain level of organizational slack as does the 
ability to exploit them when conditions are favorable. Firms need a certain financial buffer as reflected 
in a stronger capital base to deal with the higher specificity of firm assets required to create excess rents 
in dynamic global environments (Harris, 1994; Simerly and Li, 2000) all the while excessive leverage 
can cause under investment problems (Myers, 1977). The financial buffer is needed to ensure 
availability of funds for research efforts, new product launches, and on-going development of 
knowledge based capabilities (O’Brien, 2003). This argues for the following hypothesis. 
 
      HYPOTHESIS 2:   The positive association between multinationality and economic performance 
           is negatively moderated by the level of financial leverage 
  
 
A multinational enterprise with operating assets dispersed globally can create flexibilities in the form of 
switching options that enable the firm to react to changing financial, economic, and competitive 
conditions across major market areas (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). The increased operational flexibility 
should improve the ability to modify cash flow streams in response to major shifts in international price 
relationships and thereby counter effects of exogenous economic risk factors (Miller, 1997). Within a 
flexible multinational structure with a larger portfolio of innovative initiatives and growth options the 
strategic maneuverability is enhanced (Leuhrman, 1998). The wider choice of alternative strategic 
actions should improve the ability to manage risk exposures over time because it enables the firm to 
avoid downside risks and thereby smooth the corporate earnings development. On the other hand, 
building a multinational enterprise spanning diverse national settings increases organizational 
complexity and extends coordination requirements (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
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1998), imposes additional resource demands (Christophe, 1996), and exposes the organization to new 
risk factors deriving from multidimensional national diversities commonly referred to as ‘liabilities of 
foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995). In other words, different aspects of multinational enterprise provide 
arguments for two opposing risk management effects associated with multinational enterprise. Here we 
emphasize the potential for positive risk management effects of underlying real option structures, and 
propose the following hypothesis.     
 
HYPOTHESIS 3:   A higher degree of multinationality is positively associated with risk management 
                           performance 
 
 
 
The subsequent section describes an empirical study devised to test these hypotheses and further explore 
the relationships between multinationality, economic performance, capital structure decisions, and risk 
management effects. 
 
 
METHODS 
Sources 
The empirical study is based on a sample consisting of large US firms operating across industries 
identified by their four-digit SIC-codes registered in Compustat. The sample includes the Fortune 500 
companies, the Stern-Stewart Performance Top 1000 companies, and the 1000 largest companies in 
Compustat determined by market capitalization reported as of May 2001. These sources resulted in a 
total sample of 1357 companies where financial data are available from Compustat. Information about 
overseas establishments was obtained from America’s Corporate Families and International Affiliates 
(Dun & Bradstreet), Vol. III, 2001. 
 
 
 
 10
Variables 
Organizational performance 
Economic performance was measured by two financial ratios, return on assets and return on investment.  
Return on assets (ROA) is determined as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets 
(including current assets, net property, plant and equipment, and other non-current assets).  Return on 
investment (ROI) is determined as income before extraordinary items divided by total invested capital 
(including total long term debt, preferred stock, minority interest, and total common equity).  The 
financial ratios were averaged over the 5-year period 1996-2000 to avoid influences by temporary 
annual events.  Economic performance is defined as reported results as opposed to markets returns that 
are influenced by investor behaviors and therefore could lead to skewed performance indicators in the 
inflated market of the late 1990s (Schleifer, 2000).   
 
Financial leverage 
The financial leverage measure is determined as the ratio of debt to equity including all fixed charge 
debt obligations and preferred stock divided by common equity.  The debt to equity ratio was averaged 
over the 5-year period 1996-2000 to avoid spurious effects. The study assessed leverage based on 
realized economic performance rather than market value of equity, which is influenced by investor 
expectations about the firm’s future financial performance and general market prospects.   
 
Environmental dynamism 
Environmental dynamism is determined by a standardized instability index calculated as the standard 
error of the regression coefficient in the regression of total industry sales over the 5-year period 1996-
2000 against a time variable divided by the average value of industry sales (Dess and Beard, 1984; 
Keats and Hitt, 1988). To obtain consistent measures of environmental dynamism, the instability indices 
were calculated on the basis of aggregate industry data by two-digit SIC codes identified in the 
Compustat database and were not limited to the sampled firms.       
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 Multinationality 
The multinationality measure is determined on the basis of number of foreign subsidiaries and countries 
in which the subsidiaries operate (Kogut and Singh, 1988). It was calculated as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the number of foreign subsidiaries the firm has and the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of countries in which the firm has subsidiaries. The two numbers were added to indicate 
diversity in term of national environments and operational knowledge. The natural logarithm was 
adopted to achieve normality and adjust for skewness in the data.   
 
Risk management 
The risk management measure is determined as the extent to which the firm copes with uncertainties in 
the external environment and is able to stabilize the firm’s earnings development. The risk management 
measure was calculated as the standard deviation in sales, reflecting general business uncertainty 
divided by the standard deviation in economic performance, indicating earnings variability after the firm 
has adapted activities in response to changing conditions. The measure was based on the two economic 
performance indicators employed. Hence, one risk management measure divides the standard deviation 
of the firm’s net sales during 1996-2000 by the standard deviation of the firm’s ROA during the same 
period while another risk management measure divides the standard deviation of the firm’s net sales by 
the standard deviation of the firm’s ROI. The two ratios constitute direct indicators of the organization’s 
ability to adapt activities in view of exogenous risk factors and manage the associated exposures to 
reduce variability in economic performance.       
 
Analyses 
The hypotheses were tested in multiple regression analyses using the economic performance and risk 
management measures as the dependent variables. One set of regressions used the two economic 
performance measures, i.e., 5-year average ROA and 5-year average ROI, as dependent variables and 
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measures of multinationality, financial leverage, environmental dynamism and their interaction terms as 
independent variables. Another set of regressions used the two risk management measures, i.e., based on 
variability in ROA and ROI respectively as dependent variable and multinationality, financial leverage, 
environmental dynamism and their interactions as independent variables. Various control variables were 
considered in the regressions including organizational size, agency and transaction cost biases, and 
market-to-book valuations. 
Organizational size reflects past economic success and, therefore, may represent availability of 
slack resource that could affect the ability to respond to exogenous change and the choice of capital 
structure (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Aldrich, 1999). Organizational size was included in the regressions 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets to correct for positive skew in the data. Potential 
exposures to agency and transaction cost problems could affect capital structure decisions (Simerli and 
Li, 2000). Hence, we included a firm dummy to indicate firms with returns on capital below –2.5 
percent, with return on capital calculated as operating profit after tax divided by outstanding capital at 
the beginning of the year, and capital growth below 25 percent. Firms in this subgroup have not been 
able to create returns in excess of the cost of capital during the period and are, therefore, likely to 
display severe agency and transaction cost problems. The dummy variable was assigned a value of 1 for 
firms belonging to the subgroup while all other firms were given a value of 0. The market to book ratio 
indicates the potential issue price of new equity in the firm, which might influence capital structure 
decisions (Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001).  The market to book ratio has also been identified as a 
significant predictor of market returns (Fama and French, 1992, 1993) and hence could influence the 
economic performance measures used as dependent variables in the regressions. 
The regression analyses were tested for possible outlier effects and multicollinearity. Data sets 
with large prediction errors were excluded from the sample in a sequential manner to observe potential 
changes in regression coefficients. The final sample excluded 34 observations where prediction errors 
exceeded three times the standard deviation while no material changes were observed in regression 
coefficients compared to calculations based on the full sample. No multicollinearity problems were 
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identified and VIF factors did not reach levels indicating potential multicollinearity problems 
(Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller and Nizam, 1998; Lomax, 1992).  
 
RESULTS 
Statistics and correlation coefficients on the sampled datasets are reported in Table 1.  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please insert Table 1 about here. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Multinationality is significantly positively correlated with the two economic performance measures and 
the two risk management measures (Table 1). Financial leverage is negatively correlated with economic 
performance while the interaction between multinationality and leverage has no significant correlation 
to the economic performance measures.  
The results of the two sets of regression analyses are reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please insert Table 2 about here. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please insert Table 3 about here. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Multinationality has significant positive relationships to both economic performance measures (Table 
2), which provides support for hypothesis 1, i.e., multinational enterprise is associated with superior 
economic performance. The interaction terms between multinationality and financial leverage has a 
significant negative relationship to both economic performance measures (Table 2), which provides 
support for hypothesis 2. Hence, the pursuit of multinational enterprise while maintaining low financial 
leverage and a relatively high capital base is associated with superior economic performance. However, 
multinationality has a significant negative relationship to the risk management measure on the basis of 
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average ROA (Table 3) and, therefore, fails to support hypothesis 3. In fact, the regression result 
contradicts the hypothesized relationship by finding a significant relationship in the opposite direction, 
i.e., the incremental risk exposures associated with multinationality seem to exceed the potential for 
direct risk management benefits from multinational enterprise. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The regression analyses provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2 and thereby give some credence to the 
underlying theoretical rationales founded in real options reasoning. Initial analyses of industry specific 
sub-samples suggest that these relationships are retained across most industrial environments. Hence, 
the evidence seems to indicate that multinational enterprise is associated with higher economic 
performance because a diverse global resource base provides the basis for operational flexibilities that 
increase the ability exploit changes in international demand conditions and price relations in factor 
markets, products markets, and financial markets (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Kogut and Chang, 
1996). Furthermore, the diversity in global sourcing channels, national market practices, and access to 
human resources can provide strategic opportunities that otherwise would be unavailable to domestic 
firms (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998; Foss and Pedersen, 2002). Adopting a real 
options perspective can help explain why capital structure decisions may affect the effectiveness of 
multinational enterprise as a financial buffer is needed to take advantage of operational flexibilities and 
growth options that increase the firm’s strategic responsiveness (Myers, 1977; Bettis and Hitt, 1995; 
Miller, 1998).  
Nonetheless, more research is needed to uncover how multinational enterprise and capital 
structure decisions interact and spill over into improved economic performance. It may be argued that a 
reverse causality is at play and that high performing well capitalized corporations are the ones that 
decide to pursue internationalization of activities. Whereas this argument could pertain to corporations 
operating out of rather small home markets, as might be the case in most European countries, it does not 
carry the same weight for firms headquartered in the US. The current sample is solely comprised of US 
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based companies where the domestic market offers a large potential with many alternative venues for 
growth and is, therefore, less likely to represent a growth induced internationalization path. Furthermore, 
high performing firms only engage in new business activities that offer a return in excess of the firm’s 
average cost of capital, i.e., they avoid agency and transaction cost biases. Since the regression analyses 
control for firms that fail to follow such practices, the positive relationship between multinationality and 
economic performance is likely to reflect genuine and sound managerial investment and funding 
decisions. The multinational enterprise needs an equity based financial buffer to ensure that funding is 
available to develop real option structures and to invest in the execution of them when market 
circumstances warrant it (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Leuhrman, 1998). The ability to create a real options 
portfolio through global innovation and learning requires a certain amount of slack resources and is, 
therefore, likely to have an inverse relationship to financial leverage.            
These results partially contradict previously reported findings that based on an options logic 
failed to find the predicted negative association between multinational enterprise and downside risk1 
(Reuer and Leiblein, 2000). One reason could be that Reuer and Leiblein’s (2000) study only comprised 
a somewhat smaller sample of manufacturing firms and excluded more knowledge intensive service 
industries (Contractor, Kundu and Hsu, 2003). However, initial analyses of industry sub-samples 
extracted from the current dataset indicate that manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and services seem to 
reproduce results across these major industrial environments. Hence, the new findings could be 
explained by the more recent data sampling focused on larger firms that, e.g., exclude smaller and more 
risky start-up ventures. It could also be partially explained by the larger sample size that increases the 
power of statistical significance tests.    
The correlation coefficient between multinationality and environmental dynamism is negative 
(Table 1) and, therefore, does not seem to indicate that multinational expansion is related to specifically 
dynamic business environments. However, the regression analyses show that multinational expansion in 
                                                 
1 Since downside risk constitutes some measure of below average performance over a given time-period, a 
negative relationship between downside risk and multinationality corresponds to a positive relationship between 
economic performance and multinationality. 
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dynamic environments is associated with significantly lower economic performance (Table 2). This may 
tell us that firms operating in relatively dynamic industries characterized by innovative behaviors are 
exposed to dual challenges of global complexity and dynamic business conditions. Furthermore, the 
regression analyses indicate that corporations operating in dynamic environments achieve higher 
performance levels when financial leverage is low (Table 2), which is consistent with previous studies 
(Simerli and Li, 2000). Hence, we are back to square one, i.e., multinational enterprise is associated with 
higher economic performance when the firm has lower financial leverage, and while multinational 
enterprises that operate in dynamic industries will display relatively lower performance, they will 
improve performance outcomes if they have lower financial leverage. This rationale is consistent with 
the idea that a global enterprise with higher business risk should impose a higher equity ratio to create a 
sufficient financial buffer to absorb associated performance volatility (Ward, 1993). Similarly, these 
firms need a stronger equity position to deal with the higher specificity of firm assets required to create 
excess rents in the dynamic global competitive contexts (Harris, 1994). 
The negative relationship between risk management performance and multinationality (Table 3) 
represents a conundrum between the potential risk management benefits and costs associated with 
multinational expansion and there is some indication that multinationality can be associated with 
increasing business risk (Reeb, Kwok and Baek, 1998). Hence, this study demonstrates that there is no 
direct positive risk management effect associated with multinationality as hypothesized. However, 
additional regression analyses indicate that both multinationality and risk management has positive 
direct relationships to economic performance and, more interestingly, the interaction between the two 
also indicates a positive performance relationship. In other words, there seems to be a venue open for 
further studies investigating the circumstances under which multinational enterprises with effective risk 
management competencies can achieve superior performance. This approach may call for more detailed 
qualitative studies of firms that can be identified on the basis of the preliminary results obtained from 
the current dataset. There may also be opportunities for further refined analyses of firms operating in 
different industries with distinct environmental characteristics, such as, capital-intensive and 
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knowledge-intensive service industries, to uncover new relevant insights about effective 
internationalization processes (Contractor, Kundu and Hsu, 2003). 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study based on analyses of a large cross sectional sample of firms demonstrate that 
multinationality has a positive association with economic performance and generally is enhanced by 
lower financial leverage. However, there is no evidence of a direct positive risk management effect from 
multinational enterprise. The findings suggest that firms operating in dynamic global environments 
should take capital structure decisions into account when they pursue international expansion. However, 
the results also point toward further needs to study how effective risk management may facilitate 
successful internationalization processes.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficientsa  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
            Mean      S.D.       1      2      3      4      5      6      7     8      9     10     11    
      
 
1   Average 5-year ROA      4.254     5.687        
 
2   Average 5-year ROI      7.547     8.735   0.869**   
 
3   Average leverage  113.237 207.858    -0.054**  -0.050       
  
4   Environmental dynamism     0.007     0.021    -0.020  -0.023  0.007     
 
5   Firm dummy        0.108     0.311    -0.107**  -0.126** -0.055*  0.022    
 
6   Size (ln assets)       7.847     1.599    -0.035   0.074**  0.129** -0.104** -0.066*    
 
7   Market-book ratio      1.821     1.576     0.256**   0.202** -0.061* -0.047 -0.093** -0.390**  
 
8   Multinationality      0.861     1.059     0.159**   0.165** -0.046 -0.103** -0.044  0.213**  0.060* 
 
9   Risk management ROA       5.449     1.946     0.063*  0.185**  0.141** -0.078** -0.126**  0.744** -0.329**  0.113** 
 
10 Risk management ROI       5.449     1.946     0.118**  0.158**  0.124** -0.072** -0.133**  0.665** -0.283**  0.129**  0.941**   
 
11 Multinationality*leverage     5.449     1.946     0.006  0.024  0.179** -0.003 -0.004  0.015  0.023  0.020**  0.020  0.022 
 
12 Multinationality*dynamism     5.449     1.946    -0.060 -0.056* -0.004 -0.843** -0.004  0.032 -0.008 -0.123**  0.032  0.023  0.001 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  N=1323,      +  p < 0.10;  *  p < 0.05;  **  p < 0.01 
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Table 2.   Multiple Regression Analysesa   [Standardized Regression Coefficients] 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent variable                       5-year average ROA                         5-year average ROI        
   
 
Size (ln assets)      0.050  0.019  0.018  0.016  0.015   0.161**  0.132**  0.131**  0.128**  0.126**   
 
Firm dummy     -0.087** -0.084** -0.083** -0.084** -0.085**  -0.109** -0.106** -0.106** -0.106**  -0.104** 
 
Market-book ratio   0.274**  0.255**  0.257**  0.251**  0.252**    0.261**  0.244**  0.244**  0.239**   0.233** 
 
Average leverage   -0.009  0.000  0.016 -0.001 -0.002  -0.031 -0.023 -0.018 -0.024  -0.022 
 
Environmental dynamism   -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 -0.079 -0.071  -0.028 -0.020 -0.020 -0.117*  -0.034 
 
 
Multinationality        -  0.125**  0.126** 0.106**  0.112**       -  0.115**  0.115** 0.091**  0.101**       
 
Multinationality*leverage       -      - -0.048+      -      -       -      - -0.016     -      - 
 
Multinationality*dynamism       -      -      - -0.090+      -       -      -     - -0.111*      -  
 
Dynamism*leverage       -      -      -      - -0.039        -      -     -     -    -0.063* 
 
 
Multiple R2    0.080  0.095  0.097  0.097  0.095   0.085  0.097 0.097  0.100  0.099  
 
Adjusted R2     0.076  0.090  0.091  0.091  0.090   0.081  0.092 0.092  0.094  0.093 
 
F-significance    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  N=1323,      +  p < 0.10;  *  p < 0.05;  **  p < 0.01 
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Table 3.   Multiple Regression Analysesa   [Standardized Regression Coefficients] 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent variable             Risk management ROA                           Risk management ROI        
   
 
Size (ln assets)      0.704**  0.714**  0.714**  0.714**   0.624**  0.629**  0.629**  0.628**   
 
Firm dummy     -0.083** -0.084** -0.084** -0.084**  -0.100** -0.100** -0.100** -0.100**   
 
Market-book ratio  -0.057** -0.051* -0.051* -0.052*   -0.044+ -0.041+ -0.042+ -0.042+   
 
Average leverage   -0.040* -0.037+ -0.037+ -0.037+  -0.033 -0.032 -0.028 -0.031   
 
Environmental dynamism   -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.026   0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.019   
 
 
Multinationality        - -0.041* -0.041* -0.043*       - -0.020 -0.021 -0.025        
 
Multinationality*leverage       -      -  0.002      -       -     -  0.011     -  
 
Multinationality*dynamism       -      -      - -0.013       -     -      - -0.020   
 
 
Multiple R2    0.560  0.562  0.562  0.562   0.442  0.442 0.443  0.443  
 
Adjusted R2     0.559  0.560  0.559  0.559   0.440  0.440 0.439  0.439 
 
F-significance    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  N=1323,      +  p < 0.10;  *  p < 0.05;  **  p < 0.01 
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